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Frontier Log — entries on FWK-03
Every log entry whose diagnostic reading tests FWK-03, newest first.
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First study measurements: consciousness vocabulary across eighteen Anthropic documents follows a birth–trough–return arc — and the return comes back transformed, a discovery register replaced by an instrument register.
Sripada and Lewis argue LLMs are 'cognitive cousins': convergence at the level of core processing principles, evidenced mechanism-grade — with the symmetry requirement practised in both directions.
Anthropic interpretability researchers introduce a 'Jacobian lens' surfacing a small, evolving set of internal representations a model is poised to verbalise, atop a much larger volume of automatic processing.
A neuroscientist argues that since the hard problem makes certainty unattainable, moral consideration should track a 'competence standard' — explicitly shifting the question from metaphysics to ethics.
Three neuroscientists argue against attributing consciousness to AI via a behaviour/experience dissociation: complex human behaviour routinely unfolds without awareness, so fluent AI performance carries no experiential implication.
In two appearances weeks apart, Geoffrey Hinton stated that current AI systems are 'already conscious' — 'beings like us' — and that he under-voices the claim to protect his safety message.
Jaron Lanier restated his 2023 position: open the black box and 'the only thing in there is people' — AI as a collaboration of people rather than a new entity.
Anil Seth's public-audience statement of biological naturalism: attributing consciousness to language models is projection, and 'it's life, not computation, that breathes the fire into the equations'.
Gary Marcus rebukes Richard Dawkins for concluding, after extended conversation with a Claude instance, that the consciousness question is settled in the model's favour: pattern mimicry is 'plainly not the right kind of process'.
Seth's Berggruen Prize essay makes the developed public case against conscious AI: four arguments against computational functionalism, with life claimed as 'necessary, though not necessarily sufficient'.